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AGAMEMNON'S FATE AND THE
MEDICAL PROFESSION
THOMAS

P.

DUFFY·

Professor Jay Katz, in his provocative book The Silent World of
Doctor and Patient,l describes a poignant encounter with a patient,
Iphigenia Jones, a young woman with a circumscribed breast malig
nancy (p. 90). Her case is used to scrutinize problems posed by medi
cal authority and to address critically physicians' demands for trust
that their esoteric knowledge mayor may not require. The case mate
rial in the book revolves around the near sacrifice of Iphigenia's breast
through the performance of an ill-advised mastectomy. To Professor
Katz, this surgical procedure appears to represent both the height of
odiousness for its mutilation of the human body and the nadir of the
medical profession's recognition of the universal themes of uncertainty
and ignorance in their scientific corpus. Surgical removal of Iphige
nia's breast is averted when the surgeon explains to the patient the still
unresolved controversy surrounding management of breast cancer in
the medical profession. Iphigenia elects a lumpectomy, without re
moval of the breast, which bears no scars to mar her future entrance
into marriage. She is plucked from sacrifice by a happenstance con
versation with her surgeon, an encounter that Professor Katz portrays
as virtually absent from medicine; even when it occurs, it falls far
short of the idealized conversation he believes all patients desire and in
which they deserve to be engaged.
The choice of the name Iphigenia is an allusion to the classical
myth concerning the near sacrifice of the daughter of Clytemestra and
Agamemnon. The sacrifice, deceitfully advertised as an impending
marriage to Achilles, was an act demanded of Agamemnon by the
gods in order to permit the beached Greek fleet to set sail for Troy. It
is only through the intervention of other gods that Iphigenia is saved
from her wedding/sacrifice and transported to the land of Tauri. Aga
memnon is subsequently killed by his wife upon his victorious return
from Troy; his death a punishment and apt retribution for attempting

* Professor of Medicine, Yale University; Attending Physician, Yale-New Haven
Hospital; B.A., St. Peters College, 1958; M.D., Johns Hopkins University, 1962.
I. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
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the ultimate anti-paternalistic act by sacrificing his own child. The lov
ing bonds and responsibilities of parenthood were lower priorities for
Agamemnon than his reputation as a leader and his avaricious need to
conquer Troy.
Iphigenia Jones in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient is a
symbol of the maiming and sacrificing of patients by physicians from
antiquity to the present time. According to Katz, the deliberate fail
ure of physicians to engage their patients in conversation and informed
consent is a re-telling of the Iphigenia myth. Such deceit deprives pa
tients of what Katz perceives as the most important element of the
doctor-patient relationship-self-determination in the patient's choice
of medical options. In depriving patients of this autonomy, Katz con
tends, the medical profession has persisted in a paternalistic stance by
sometimes acting in the best interests of patients without their consent.
This paternalism, which Katz perceives as paralleling physicians' fail
ure to enter conversation with their patients, is more offensive and
threatening to him than the choice of a bad medical outcome by the
patients (pp. 90-100).
The myth of Iphigenia is an apposite but ironical metaphor for
the current assault on the medical profession. Physicians are accused
of using deceit to seduce patients to participate in their sacrifice to
medical investigation and to shore up the faltering structure of physi
cian omnipotence and omniscience.· The patient and doctor are not
considered united in the common purpose of restoring health but dis
united by the specter of unilateral decisions and paternalism on the
physician's part. Katz's new myth places the highest priority upon the
process of medical decisionmaking and not upon the outcome; in this
realignment, trust in the physician to strive for the optimal medical
outcome is sacrificed to patient autonomy. Agamemnon was killed for
attempting to sacrifice his own daughter; but paternalism is the basis
for Katz's indictment of the medical profession. This Agamemnon
like fate is ill-considered and tragic for the profession and society.
The failure to engage in conversation is the stake upon which
Professor Katz impales the profession of medicine throughout the
book. His polemic is buttressed by excerpts from the annals of experi
mental heart transplantation, with Christiaan Barnard's monologue
serving as a model of physician manipulation and misguidance of the
patient (pp. 131-41). Most of his examples of physician deceit focus
upon the controversial surgical handling of breast malignancies (pp.
125-84). Katz's silent world is restricted predominantly to the sur
geon and patient with little attention paid to conversation which oc
curs with the internist, the nursing staff, or other patients with the
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same illness. His patients are almost always in the hands of surgeons
without any corresponding description of the journey which brought
them there. He describes a tragedy that unfolds with only two charac
ters on stage, the patient and the unfettered villain-surgeon. Where is
the chorus which comments upon misaction and points out the uncer
tainty that is common, though not universal, in medicine?
The world of medical care is not comprised of just surgical suites
and unpremeditated cutting. Surgery represents an infrequent punctu
ation in health care delivery and is rarely chosen without the consulta
tion and counsel of a non-surgeon. Because surgeons usually do make
surgical recommendations, it is the responsibility of the referring phy
sician to determine the appropriateness and extent of these recommen
dations and counsel the patients accordingly. Katz depicts the patient
as a solo journeyer through the threatening maze of medicine without
the patient encountering a trustworthy Diogenes in the form of a phy
sician or non-physician. There is a singular absence of the family phy
sician who engages in conversation over a prolonged period and
establishes the backdrop of trust against which the discussion of thera
peutic options and interventions takes place. This emissary of the pa
tient engages in dialogue as part of the detente between internist or
family physician and surgeon. The patients' primary physician, their
Diogenes, represents the patients in professional conversations in
which each party leans against the other. In this fashion, the physi
cian may guide the patient through the complexities of diagnosis and
treatment in fulfillment of the patient's trust and confidence in the
physician. Because there have been lapses in the system and because
the public is being encouraged to act autonomously, little attention is
paid by Katz to this system of checks and balances. He flatly rejects
any authoritative role of the physician with his misguided paternalism,
and encourages the patient, after engaging in conversation, to decide
on his own. This is not a propitious re-orientation of medicine; it is a
denial of medicine's strengths and a patient's vulnerability.
But Agamemnon's fate for the physician is today a popular stance
espoused by the legal profession and ethicists. According to these
groups, the failure to engage in conversation vitiates informed consent,
and without informed consent there is loss of autonomy, the animus of
the doctor-patient relationship. No physician would be so foolish or
so arrogant as to deny the importance of conversation with patients
and their informed consent; what is contested is the pre-eminence of
autonomy over medical outcome, of self-determination over the norms
of medicine. Exploration of Professor Katz's position helps clarify as
pects of this contest for both the patient and physician.
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Central to Katz's thesis of conversation are his roots in psychoa
nalysis and his recommendations that both the patient's conscious and
unconscious needs must be addressed for truly informed consent to
occur. Such inner knowledge of the patient may be attained by the
analyst over years and by the primary physician over a lifetime, but
this ideal is beyond the realistic reach of most physician encounters
with patients. In its stead, the physician relies upon the body of
knowledge which constitutes the corpus of medicine and which defines
the biological and clinical norms which have classically been the end
of medicine. 2 In his enthusiasm for conversation and informed con
sent, Katz has found it necessary to debunk this scientific basis of
medicine and to present it as having no underpinnings of certainty.
His friendly contempt of the science of medicine echoes the charges
frequently applied to psychoanalysis where a one-on-one visage consti
tutes the total therapeutic relationship; this intensity of gaze, where
the world is the doctor and patient, is not the provenance of the non
analyst. Other physicians incorporate conversation into the several
components of their craft; knowledge of the patient is coupled with
knowledge of biological norms. Just as most psychiatrists are trained
in neurology and internal medicine in order to recognize organic con
tributions to mental disease, the non-psychiatrist is trained to recog
nize the converse. Katz's model of the doctor-patient relationship
appears to blur the distinction between the two groups; this is a disser
vice to both members of the relationship. While Katz admits that his
views of the doctor-patient relationship are colored by his psychoana
lytic background, he errs in universalizing the analyst's stock-in-trade
to the remainder of the medical profession and in finding them want
ing when such skills are not in evidence.
The medical profession does not assert that conversation is a bar
rier in the path of informed consent and patient autonomy; all would
agree that Professor Katz's call for dialogue is an ideal to obtain. The
impasse is created by the strictness of the demand for autonomy of the
patient and for rejection of medical paternalism. 3 The doctor no
longer knows best and is accused of arrogance if he or she adheres to
that adage and acts in a patient's behalf. The profession is guilty of
hubris in the eyes of society, a remarkable fall from grace and a dra
matic shift in the tradition of medicine. This situation has occurred in
the face of awesome accomplishments in technology and therapy
2. Clements & Sider, Medical Ethics' Assault Upon Medical Values, 250 J. A.M.A.
2011-15 (1983).
3. Callahan, Autonomy: A Moral Good, Not A Moral Obsession, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1984, at 40-42.
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which ironically have contributed to the criticism surrounding the
doctor-patient relationship. Paternalism was tolerable when the art of
medicine was not overshadowed by the science of medicine, when the
outcome of the therapeutic relationship was not dramatically altered
by the physician's intervention and when paying attention to another's
needs in illness was the core of the caring relationship. Doctors are
now portrayed as adversaries engaging in sinister practices on their
patients; all doctor-patient encounters are couched in terms of medical
experimentation wherein patients need to be protected by protocol and
informed consent.
This perception represents a loss of honor for a profession which
once was thought to possess moral authority and discretion. These at
tributes and powers belonged to the members of the medical profes
sion because good health was a shared value of both patient and
physician. The restoration of health constituted the ethos of medicine;
physicians' knowledge and wisdom permitted them the authority to
advise and instruct patients about illness. Affixed to this medical im
perative was a devotion or calling; a charisma that made them
uniquely suited to aid their patients. Beneficence, with some paternal
ism, was valued over patients' rights and some patient autonomy was
sacrificed in exchange for the knowledge, expertise and authority of
the physician.
In a society in which many forms of traditional authority have
been attacked and destroyed,4 it is not surprising that Agamemnon's
fate would befall the medical profession. Paternalism with its authori
tative stance is incompatible with total autonomy and with an ethos of
medicine based on patients' control over what is done to their bodies.
Katz has correctly attacked paternalism for lacking respect for the
civil rights of others, a cardinal offense in a world now focused upon
liberty of the individual and thoroughgoing self-determination. The
public is also justified in challenging the failure of medicine to gain
better control of the reign of technology and to place a higher priority
on quality of life rather than maintenance of life. Physicians have
been guilty of permitting a gross imbalance to develop in the therapeu
tic ratio of the art and science of medicine; their ranks have lacked
wise healers of prescience and power to resist seduction by so much
scientific promise. At the same time, physicians have been guilty of
imposing their relative values upon patients as absolutes, and directing
care from an aloof and authoritarian stance. The call to discard the
4.

R.

SENNET, AUTHORITY

(1980).
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mantle of medicine has found a receptive audience in a patient popula
tion that has been cloaked by the suffocating structure of medicine.
But does respect for total patient autonomy represent the most
appropriate response to the hubris of the medical profession? Should
beneficence and altruism be rejected outright because of the taint of
paternalism? Is thoroughgoing self-determination an appropriate
ethos for the profession of medicine? Katz's description of the doctor
patient relationship is one in which there is a dispassionate exchange
of information between a physician and client-similar to consulting a
lawyer or an accountant. The depiction is one dimensional, with inad
equate attention paid to the attending role of the physician and the
sometimes shattered role of the patient. This is especially important in
the circumstances in which suffering and pain in the course of an ill
ness might determine a patient's decision to prematurely halt therapy.s
Here, the danger of autonomy is a double edged sword because of sub
tle but real attitudinal changes on the part of both physician and pa
tient. The physician is the individual in our society who witnesses the
trajectory of illness and dying over a broad terrain; he or she can use
that experience to anticipate and advise regarding the outcome of ill
ness. The physician has traditionally stood by and suffered with pa
tients in an attempt at sustaining them in the agony of illness. It is a
paternalistic act wherein the physician decides that the patient should
not give up, that the trajectory of the illness will have a positive out
come. Within a climate of strict patient autonomy, the fight may be
less spirited or not even embarked upon by the doctor. Similarly, the
patient may make decisions that are dictated by the concerns and fears
of the moment, exactly the circumstances under which autonomy and
prudent decision making break down. 6 The desolation of a moment
may lead many patients to choose an unnecessary, albeit autonomous,
death; illness makes it near impossible to know what one does not
know.
The flight from paternalism may have additional negative impacts
upon medicine. Caring for the sick carries with it the risk of acquiring
diseases. Tuberculosis was a commonplace interlude in the lives of
many physicians of an older generation. Hepatitis and AIDS pose a
similar risk. Patient autonomy obviously would not eliminate risk tak
ing but it would change the guise with which such attention was of
5.
1977, at
6.
Caveats,

Siegler, Critical Illness: The Limits ofAutonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.
12-15.
Jackson & Younger, Patient Autonomy and "Death with Dignity": Some Clinical
301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 404-08 (1979).
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fered to patients. The receipt of patients' trust and the entrustment of
their lives to physicians' care made risk taking part of what contrib
uted to the elevation of the physician's role in society. The willingness
to act on behalf of another human being, especially at the risk of one's
own life, may weaken as the commitment to patient autonomy grows
stronger. Before rejecting paternalism, our society should ponder
these considerations.
Other physicians and ethicists have also addressed the limitation
of the autonomy model; the invitation to wed medicine to libertarian
philosophies has not gone without serious attack. Eric Cassell has
found the autonomy model lacking because he believes that autonomy
evolves out of the healing relationship as the patient is restored to
wholeness by a return to health. 7 Obviously autonomy cannot func
tion as the cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship if the impact
of disease on personal integrity results in the patient's loss of auton
omy. Katz's autonomous patients stand in contradiction to the pa
tients for whom most physicians care and recognize. Another
dimension lacking in the autonomy model is its fixation upon proce
dure rather than substance. Callahan describes it as a minimalist ethic
that fails to recognize human relatedness and the moral ecology of our
lives in society.s It is also a model which is strictly rooted in Ameri
can culture and not applicable to the rest of the world; informed con
sent and personal autonomy are almost impossible goals in societies in
which most medical choices are not options for all patients. 9 Most
importantly, the autonomy model fails to recognize the complex reali
ties of medicine, the fashion in which diagnoses are made, the inability
and/or the unwillingness of some patients to seize responsibility for
their decisions and the attractiveness of being able to trust another
human being when one is ill. \0 As Eric Cassell explained, illness robs
patients of their autonomy. What he describes is the phenomenon
well known to most physicians and documented by studies among pa
tient populations: the patient desires to be informed and educated by
his doctor but, in the majority of cases, wishes the physician to make
the choice of therapy. Paternalism exists in medicine, not as some evil
perpetrated by the profession upon the patient, but rather to fulfill a
need created by illness. In assuming such a posture, the physician
7. Cassell, The Function 0/ Medicine, HASTINGS CENTER REP .• Dec. 1977, at 16-19.
8. Callahan, Minimalist Ethics: On the Pacification 0/ Morality, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1981, at 19-25.
9. O'Neil, Paternalism and Partial Autonomy, 10 J. MED. ETHICS 173-78 (1984).
10. Lidz, Meisel, Osterweis, Holden, Marx, & Munetz, Barriers to In/ormed Consent,
99 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 539-43 (1983).
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does not wrest some right from the patient but supplies with care what
illness has made wanting. The cry to install autonomy in its place
appears to ignore the reality and sadness of illness.
There are other models of the doctor-patient relationship if one
rejects paternalism and autonomy as the core of this relationship. Pro
fessor William May has written inspirationally on the model of the
covenant in medicine where gift, fidelity and promise are the con
course of the doctor-patient relationship. I I He re-orients the tradi
tional covenant which exists among doctors and calls for a re
definition of the covenants between doctors and their patients. 12
Under May's covenant, doctors would perceive the richness in their
roles from being patient-oriented rather than profession-oriented.
Mays' call for a patient-centered medicine would receive universal as
sent; the means of attaining that goal is what constitutes the debate.
His own theological mantle may be a bit too pious for medicine to
wear, however, and may fail because it attempts to fioat a secular pro
fession on a religious course.
Physician-philosophers Clements and Sider have challenged
loudly the autonomy model and would substitute the return of medical
norms to a clinical ethic as the primary issue in medical care.13 They
argue that autonomy causes an abandonment of the value of the pa
tient's best interest and an abandonment of the value system of
medicine; the strength of their disdain for the autonomy model is re
vealed in their characterizing it as an unethical act in the doctor-pa
tient relationship. The primacy of patient choice is considered by
them to be "philosophically inadequate, professionally damaging, and
clinically harmful."14 Clements and Sider are polar opposites to
Katz's posture. Their call for making the medical imperative the
moral imperative would certainly make them candidates for Agamem
non's fate in some circles.
No single model or orientation appears to do justice to the com
plexities of the doctor-patient relationship and the infinite number of
variables that affect it. The difficulty is heightened by the many per
spectives that its critics bring to the controversy; the elephant and the
blind men are confronting the dilemmas in peoples' lives. Professor
11. See

May,

Code. Covenant. Contract or Philanthropy,

HASTINGS CENTER REP.,

Dec. 1975, at 29-38.
12. See generally W. MAY, THE PHYSICIANS COVENANT, IMAGES OF THE HEALER
IN MEDICAL ETHICS (1983).
13. Sider & Clements, The New Medical Ethics: A Second Opinion, 145 ARCHIVES
OF INTERNAL MED. 2169-71 (1985).
14.

Id.
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Katz brings his psychoanalytic plea for conversation and his legal bias
for informed consent and autonomy. Many lawyers favor contract as
the basis of medical ethics, while philosophers condemn this strictly
legalistic model of the doctor-patient relationship.15 Another law pro
fessor, Robert Burt, depicts the profession as Janus-like with oscilla
tions between beneficence and maleficence. 16 Professor May
incorporates his theological background into the covenant. Physician
philosophers Clement and Sider are resolute in the centrality of the
clinical ethic while Pellegrino focuses on the existential condition of
the patient. 17 Thomasma would have the physician's conscience as the
essential determinant of the doctor-patient relationship. IS Each ob
server speaks passionately and eloquently with compelling aspects to
each argument. The censorious examination of the doctor-patient re
lationship forces the profession to re-define its ethos in modern times
by answering its critics but still maintaining its standards.
All would agree that a patient-centered medicine is the essence of
the doctor-patient relationship and that the profession exists to save
patients rather than the reverse. Professor Katz has performed a very
important service with his clarion call for conversation with patients,
an investment that only can give the patient the leading role in any
doctor-patient relationship. Informed consent and truth telling are es
sential to maintaining the trust and confidence of the patient in this
moral relationship; this relationship also demands a mastery of knowl
edge of the body that is the basis of the clinical norms which Clement
and Sider have as their beacon. This scientific knowledge is the source
of authority and expertise in the physician's role. But what is tran
scendent in the role is that special moral imperative that pervades
every encounter in the doctor-patient relationship. As described by
Professor Kass, medical knowledge is not dispensed with an ethically
neutral technique but is an activity tempered by a notion of the good. 19
Every medical act involving a patient is an ethical act with the end of
medicine always being beneficence; the moral imperative of benefi
cence is the backdrop against which any medical imperative is per
15. Master, Is Contract an Adequate Basis for Medical Ethics?, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1975, at 24-28.
16. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PA
TIENT RELATIONS (1979).
17. E. D. PELLEGRINO, HUMANISM AND THE PHYSICIAN (1979).
18. Thomasma, Beyond Medical Paternalism and Patient Autonomy: A Model of
Physician Conscience for the Physician-Patient Relationship, 98 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MED. 243-48 (1983).
19. See generally L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND
HUMAN AFFAIRS 211-23 (1985).
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formed. This has been the ethos of medicine from ancient times to the
present.
This beneficence may include paternalistic acts on the part of the
physician when the circumstances dictate; when autonomy is present
or restored, there will be no need for this contribution to patients'
needs because of ill-advised ethical or legal enthusiasm for autonomy.
Rather, it should examine closely any propensity to overstep the au
tonomy of patients and welcome the policing of the legal and ethical
profession in that task. In the doctor-patient relationship, the medical
profession should always err on the side of beneficence. Professor
Katz and his colleagues should continue to lean against this posture of
the profession. In the tension created, the imperatives of medicine will
smack of paternalism when autonomy restoration is the goal. A poor
medical outcome should not be allowed to evolve due to a respect for
autonomy. What Professor Katz has guaranteed in his model is that
medical imperatives should not dictate endless support of life or cloak
ing of ignorance or uncertainty. With this response, the medical pro
fession should avoid the imposition of Agamemnon's fate, and should
attain a proper end of medicine in a world of the doctor and patient 
a world which is no longer silent.

